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The Political Legitimacy of Company Law and Regulation 
Daniel Attenborough 
ABSTRACT: Two interrelated objectives are pursued in this article: the first 
concerns the relationship and interaction between the UK’s company law and market-
based regulation and; second, where market regulators have the potential to mould 
and influence the substantive law, it is important to understand the sources and 
contours of their legitimacy to produce and enforce rules.  Although the article finds 
that the two systems retain carefully defined, essentially consistent, and mutually 
complementary roles, it submits that market-based formations do not readily or 
plausibly lend themselves to dominant political and democratic narratives, which 
customarily nourish and support the legitimacy of state interventionist techniques.  
What is more, the deployment of a rival conception of legitimacy, conceived as 
neutral-technocratic expertise and market determinable practices to support both the 
general acceptability and the actual effects of regulation, is arguably contentious 
because of regulatory capture and wider socially determinative effects beyond the 
regulated constituencies.  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Two interrelated objectives are pursued in this article: one instrumental, the other 
substantive.  The narrow objective is to address a question that has attracted very little 
attention in company law scholarship,1 although it is, it must be said, of considerable 
theoretical, and potentially also some practical, importance in respect to the direction 
and control of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.  The question 
concerns the interaction between substantive company law and market-based 
regulation.  Does UK company law and market-based regulation work together as, in 
                                                             
 Associate Professor in Corporate Law, Durham University.  Earlier versions of this article were 
presented at the 2016 Annual conference of the Society of Legal Scholars in the University of Oxford, 
and at seminars in Manchester University, University College, London, and UC Berkeley.  I am 
thankful for the extremely helpful comments and suggestions received from participants at these 
events, and especially to Marc Moore, Paul O’Connell, Gavin Phillipson, Chris Riley, and Alexander 
Williams.  The usual disclaimers apply.  Also, a significant part of this work was undertaken while I 
was at the University of California, Berkeley, to which I am grateful for providing a productive and 
stimulating working environment.   
1  Virtually the only partially related discussion of which the author is aware is in D. Kershaw, 
‘Corporate Law and Self-Regulation’ in J. N. Gordon and W. G. Ringe (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Corporate Law and Governance (2018, OUP) 869. 
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some sense, a single coherent, integral body of rulemaking, or do they constitute two 
separate entities, two streams running on parallel lines one of which occasionally 
feeds the other, but which are destined for ever to retain their separate roles?  In 
posing this question, it must be made clear that we are not concerned with the 
question of how well law and regulation fit together, but with the logically prior 
question of how they fit together.  It is trite that large areas of both the law and 
market-based regulation are problematic, but is it one problematic area or are there 
two?  This may seem a rather theoretical, or even metaphysical, question.  Yet there 
are a number of important practical issues involved here, in the sense that market-
based regulation is a dynamic, developing body of rules and norms just as much as 
legal doctrines and legal decisions, and the way in which they map onto each other 
becomes a matter of no little importance.2 The most empirically significant regulatory 
formations on which we focus are: The Corporate Governance Code, The Listing 
Rules and Listing Requirements, and The Takeover Code.   
 
While there is in one respect no neat dividing line between substantive law and 
market regulation, 3  the two species of rules remain distinguishable. 4  First and 
                                                             
2 M. Petrin, ‘Regulatory Analysis in Corporate Law’ (2016) 79(4) Modern Law Review 537, 529.  See 
also, P. L. Davies, ‘Corporate Boards in the United Kingdom’ in P. Davies, K. Hopt, R. Nowark, and 
G. von Solinge (eds), Corporate Boards in Law and Practice: A Comparative Analysis in Europe 
(OUP, 2014), 713, 773. 
3 An early example that covers the main arguments along jurisprudential lines can be found in J. Raz, 
‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81(5) Yale Law Journal 823.  For a more recent 
example focused specifically on corporate regulation, see E. Ferran, ‘Corporate Law, Codes and Social 
Norms – Finding the Right Regulatory Combination and Institutional Structure’ (2001) 1(2) Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 381, 382 and 386-390. 
4 It is submitted that the ideological conservatism, enumerated by the likes of Ferran, ibid, can be 
viewed as symptomatic of a discipline trying to face up to a new and rapidly changing scene.  
Conversely, there is a genuine intellectual concern, forcefully articulated by Simon Roberts that 
lumping together state law and diverse forms of delegated law, obscures the distinctiveness of 
centralised forms of governance and lets blinkered lawyers in to view other forms of normative 
ordering through distorted lenses.  On this point, see S. Roberts, ‘Against Legal Pluralism: Some 
Reflections on the Contemporary Enlargement of the Legal Domain’ (1998) 42 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism 95; S. Roberts, ‘After Government? On Representing Law Without the State’ (2005) 68 
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foremost, companies’ legislation and the courts today function to generate higher 
order rules that set out a template for the processes and constraints of the formation 
and continuing regulation of companies during their lifecycle. Second, over the past 
several decades substantive company law has, in different shapes, focused on 
managing and containing the problem of managerial agency costs: the economic costs 
incurred when managers act in their own, not the shareholders’ interests.  
Notwithstanding, in targeted areas of socially sub-optimal behaviour and outcomes 
the longstanding British regulatory style has created a presumptive view that market 
participants are entitled to generate and enforce lower order regulation to resolve the 
problems of their own making.  But even where the state is actively responsible for 
rule design and enforcement, sometimes the law has remained curiously 
indeterminate.  On this basis, alternative market forms could potentially mould and 
influence the substantive content of that law.  Properly understood as facilitating 
productivity organised in companies by reducing suboptimal market behaviour and 
managerial agency costs, these regulatory devices purport to maintain an exclusive 
focus ‘on the (functional) means rather than (normative) ends of purportedly efficient 
boardroom practices.’ 5  However, the regulator constituencies tend in practice to 
embody a ‘common investor-protectionist ethos, and corresponding disregard for 
public policy concerns extraneous to considerations of shareholder welfare’. 6 
Although this practical understanding includes and is consistent with company law’s 
shareholder prioritisation, a question mark is raised about its compatibility with 
company law’s shareholder weighting.  In particular, market-based regulation 
portends to structure and amplify shareholder interests and value pressures (relative to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Modern Law Review 1.  See also, W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a 
Global Perspective (CUP, 2009) 371-375.   
5 M. Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart, 2013) 172. 
6 Ibid.  This is discussed further in section C. 
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the UK’;s substantive company lawmaking bodies), which is likely to further reduce 
management insulation from shareholder value pressures.   
 
Typically, the way in which companies are governed, and the way such governance is 
perceived, contributes inexorably to the political legitimacy of corporate control, and 
this legitimacy underpins both the acceptance and the effects of corporate activity.  
From the perspective of orthodox political narratives and democratic criteria, 
Parliamentary lawmaking derives a substantial part of its procedural and substantive 
legitimacy from sovereign prerogative, processes of consensual democracy, and 
accountability to the courts.  Similar thinking can be applied to the court’s role, which 
has to apply the prescriptions of the legislature, or the established principles deduced 
from a series of precedents, to individual disputes.  Yet an equivalent narrative for 
today’s market-based regulation is less straightforward when it encounters and 
interacts with state-legitimacy pressures.  These dynamic and semi-autonomous rule-
systems, which are often thought to derive survival and legitimacy from rival notions 
of ‘neutral-technocratic’ expertise and market consensus, 7  tend to reclassify acts 
conventionally regarded ‘public’ and ‘political’ as ‘commercial’, ‘private’, and, 
therefore, properly ‘legal’.8 This approach leads the article to a second, and broader, 
question: does market-based regulation retain a firm basis on which to rest its 
continuing legitimacy? The obvious tension in this regard is that ‘these authorities, or 
some of them at least, wield significant powers which may be abused to the detriment 
of their own members, third parties or the public at large: they may be exploited, or 
                                                             
7 Moore, above n 5, 170-171. 
8 F. Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers (CUP, 2007) 9-
10. 
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their interests may be otherwise insufficiently taken into account.’ 9  This article 
foregrounds this tension between company law and market-based regulatory 
legitimacy and examines the strength of the case for the possibility of market-based 
regulation obscuring the basic principles of law around which that regulation has 
developed.  
 
B. THE ROLE AND LIMITS OF UK COMPANY LAW 
In order to make sense of the question of legal-regulatory ‘fit’, it is necessary to 
identify the content and purpose of the UK’s company law.  Functionalist accounts of 
a particular set of legal rules focus typically on the purposes served for society by the 
rules in question.10 In this regard, company law’s role is to provide continuing ‘rules 
of the game’ to facilitate and control the activities of business associations during 
their lifecycle.  A functionalist understanding, accordingly, seeks to explain how the 
system of company law achieves this end.11 First and foremost, its legal framework 
primarily enables the structuring of economic power of businesses that ‘incorporate’ 
to secure such advantages as convenience, financial flexibility, and limited liability.12 
For example, company law establishes the structure of the corporate form, which acts 
as an incentive to organise productivity and plays a critical role in promoting 
enterprise and investment.  Other, of the many examples in which the law designs 
basic ‘nuts and bolts’ of productivity organized in companies include: the corporate 
                                                             
9 A. C. Page, ‘Self-Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension’ (1986) 49(2) Modern Law Review 141, 
142. 
10 J. Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition’ 
(2006) 58(1) Current Legal Problems 369, 371-373.  For a similar account of US corporate law, see M. 
A. Eisenberg, ‘The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation’ (2005) 2(1) 
Berkley Business Law Journal 167, 169. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See e.g. R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386. 
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constitution, corporate governance issues (including the directors’ role, duties, and 
responsibilities), as well as shareholder remedies, the protection of creditors, and 
directors’ liabilities on insolvency.  As a second order objective – and one that flows 
from the use of the corporate form – company law plays an important role in 
mediating the principal-agent conflict between the company’s shareholders and its 
hired directors.  This assures that the directors are responsive to the shareholders’ 
interests rather than pursuing their own personal interests.13 Minimising agency costs 
is achieved through regulatory strategies that prescribe substantive terms that govern 
the content of the principal-agent relationship, tending to constrain, either directly or 
in practice, the director’s behaviour,14 and governance strategies that seek to facilitate 
the shareholders’ empowerment and control over managerial behaviour.15 Ultimately, 
the UK’s legal ecology directly or indirectly assigns priority interest to the company’s 
shareholders relative to other affected parties in the effective functioning of wealth 
generating companies.  
 
                                                             
13 The most influential paper on this subject is M. Jensen and W. Meckling, ‘Managerial Behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
14 See CA 2006, ss 170-177.  In particular, s 172(1) makes clear that shareholders are now the intended 
beneficiaries of corporate productivity, and enjoy relative priority under varying circumstances.  As 
provided for under CA 2006, ss 260-264, shareholders have the right to initiate proceedings on behalf 
of the company for breaches of directors’ general fiduciary duties. 
15 The shareholders in general meeting retain residual and ultimate decision-making power through 
statute and common law.  For example, under the CA 2006, shareholders have the right to vote on the 
amendment of the articles of association (ss 33 and 21), approval for all economically significant 
corporate transactions (ss 177, 182, 190-196), mandatory access to the proxy card (ss 303, 314-317, 
338-340), anti-dilution rights (ss 171, 549-551, 561-563), and so forth.  What is more, shareholders 
retain the important entitlement to remove directors ‘without cause’ under CA 2006, s 168.  
Shareholders are also formally empowered (concurrently with the board itself) to appoint new directors 
by way of ordinary resolution under the company’s articles, although this default rule is formally 
subject to variation by individual companies.  However, in the case of Premium Listed companies it is 
reinforced by the express UK Corporate Governance Code requirement – applicable on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis – that directors be (re)elected by shareholders, which in larger FTSE 350 companies at 
least should take place on an annual basis.  See Financial Reporting Council, UK Corporate 
Governance Code (July 2018), Code Provision 3.18, available at: 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF>.  
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Notwithstanding, the UK corporate legal order does not address every aspect of 
business activity.  In particular, the government has, as a historical matter, sometimes 
considered it more expedient to defer to market mechanisms to constrain 
opportunistic behaviour, excessive risk-taking, and other socially undesirable 
behaviour.16 When the substantive law must address, and historically has addressed, 
the doctrinal minutiae of business regulation and, in particular, the radical or game-
changing questions central to company law and policy, its rules and decisions are not, 
of necessity, at the same time, doctrinally dispositive.  While the limits of legal rules 
are almost inevitable in most living areas of law, it is most conspicuous in the 
corporate context in tensions, explained above, between the company’s shareholders 
and its hired directors.  The UK’s principal company law is, of course, the Companies 
Act 2006, which – like all legislation – is a product of the political processes and is 
thus subject to representative democratic criteria and popular accountability.17 An Act 
of Parliament, once established, is often a trade-off between, on the one hand, distinct 
practical and political constraints and, on the other, what the legislature intended.  
This arrangement inevitably gives rise to the articulation of conservative and/or 
indeterminate legal rules. 18  Simultaneously, the English courts have a general 
obligation in construing statutes to make law that effectuates legislative purpose.19 
Where the legislative purpose is extremely vague or the delegation of the law-making 
power to the courts broad, the courts’ interpretative role proceeds as a circumscribed 
                                                             
16 This will be discussed in Part C. 
17 On this point, see D. Feldman ‘Preface’ in D. Feldman (ed), Law in Politics, Politics in Law (Hart, 
2014) I.   
18 Some of the scholarly writing on the most recent company law reform project seems to chime with 
this point.  See e.g. S. Worthington, ‘Reforming Directors’ Duties’ (2001) 64(3) Modern Law Review 
439, 458; R. Goddard, ‘“Modernising Company Law”: The Government’s White Paper’ (2003) 66(3) 
Modern Law Review 402, 423. 
19 Since the enactment of the Companies Act 2006, much of UK company law is now the preserve of 
statute law, and the instances of the courts’ statutory construction of extant companies’ legislation are 
voluminous.  For general academic support on this point, see e.g. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Clarendon, 2nd edn., 1994) 132-133; H. R. Hahlo, ‘Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace’ (1967) 
30 Modern Law Review 241, 248. 
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formalistic style of legal reasoning.20 In this regard, the general obligation of the 
courts is to interpret and apply rigidly the prescriptions of the legislature, or the 
generalised principles deduced from a series of precedents, to individual disputes, 
which must be fitted into the existing body of the law.21 
 
Ultimately, the ingrained legislative conservatism and formalistic climate of the 
common law, taken together, are likely to have a dampening effect on the perceived 
impact of company law’s weighted shareholder presence, which, paradoxically, could 
provide the benefit of defining its socially undesirable consequences out of existence.  
The following examples provide merely a flavour of the limits of the common law 
tradition, and of statute, in this practical and real-world sense.  First, when we think 
about the perennial questions central to corporate theory it is impossible to avoid the 
uncertainty in law about the nature of ownership and control in publicly listed 
companies.22 Second, perhaps the clearest expression of company law’s ambiguity 
regarding the intended beneficiaries of corporate production is the fact that directors 
are required under the duty of good faith to act in the honest belief that their action 
was taken, simultaneously, in the best interests of the shareholders and the company 
                                                             
20 M. J. Whincop, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law (Ashgate, 2001) 2.  
For an informative account of the altogether more policy-oriented jurisprudential traditions of the US 
courts, see E. B. Rock, ‘Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American Legal Realism’ (2015) 
163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2019. 
21 See H. L .A. Hart, ‘American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream’ (1977) 11 Georgia Law Review 969, 979.  See also, T. Allan, ‘Questions of legality and 
legitimacy: Form and substance in British constitutionalism’ (2011) 9 International Constitutional Law 
Journal 155, 185; W. Friedman, ‘Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling’ (1966) 
29(6) Modern Law Review 593, 595.   
22  For an excellent exposition, and critique, of share ‘ownership’ as a doctrinal basis for the 
shareholders’ role in corporate governance, see P. Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder 
Ownership’ (1999) 62(1) Modern Law Review 32.  For earlier noises about the unsatisfactory legal 
conception of share ownership, see A. A. Berle, ‘Modern Functions of the Corporate System’ (1962) 
62 Columbia Law Review 433, 448.  
  9 
itself.23 Third, this analytical frame of reference could be extended to the directors’ 
general company law duty of care and skill.24 In spite of receiving close judicial and 
scholarly attention in the 1990s, and again during the most recent company law 
reform project, the duty is incomplete in the sense that the limited case law means it is 
difficult to know what amounts to a careful process and what is to be expected of 
directors in order to determine what a typical careful director performing the role 
would do. 25  Fourth, the ex ante disciplinary options for shareholders, which are 
exercised in general meeting, tend to be practically limited in the case of publicly 
listed companies, 26  where enforcement options typically give way to ex ante 
monitoring by outside directors and institutional shareholders.27 Fifth and finally, the 
statutory derivative claim procedure, which notionally allows a shareholder to bring a 
legal action on the company’s behalf in order to remedy wrongs done to it, specifies 
permission/leave barriers that shareholders are unlikely to overcome, thereby creating 
little incentive to litigate.28   
 
                                                             
23 CA 2006, ss 170 and 172(1).  For a detailed and nuanced analysis of the distinction between a 
shareholder-first idea and the pre-2006 common law articulation of the company’s interests, see D. 
Attenborough, ‘Misreading the Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith’ (2020) 20(1) Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies [ ].   
24 Section 174 of the Companies Act 2006. 
25 On the marginal or peripheral role of the directors’ duty of care after the 2008 global financial crisis, 
see M. Moore, ‘Redressing Risk Oversight Failure in UK and US Listed Companies: Lessons From the 
Citigroup and RBS Litigation’ (2017) 18 European Business Organization Law Review 733.  For an 
earlier example from the US, which fundamentally centres on the limits of the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care, see J. Seligman, ‘The New Corporate Law’ (1993) 59(1) Brooklyn Law Review 1.   
26 A prime example is the mandatory ‘without cause’ removal right under CA 2006, s 168.  But see, L. 
E. Strine, ‘The Soviet Constitution Problem in Comparative Corporate Law: Testing the Proposition 
that European Corporate Law is More Stockholder Focused than US Corporate Law’ (2016) 89 
Southern California Law Review 1239.  See also, D. Attenborough, ‘The Vacuous Concept of 
Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2013) 14(2) European Business Organization Law Review 147; A. R. 
Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders’ [2007] Journal of 
Business Law 656.  
27 M. Gelter and G. Helleringer, ‘Corporate Opportunities in the US and the UK: How Differences in 
Enforcement Explain Differences in Substantive Fiduciary Duties’ in D. Gordon Smith and A. S. Gold 
(eds.), Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law (Edward Elgar, 2018) 331. 
28 On the infrequent use of the regime, see A. R. Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the statutory scheme 
for derivative actions under the Companies Act 2006’ (2016) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
39, 41. 
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C. THE RELATINOSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND REGULATION 
Due to powerful political and economic priorities, the majority of which were driven 
over several decades by globalisation and a neoliberal order,29 the dominant trend in 
world affairs has been the ‘disaggregation of power into myriad spheres of authority’ 
to facilitate market-based ‘norms, informal rules and regimes.’30 On this basis, the 
state retains a residual role in delineating the contours of companies’ regulation, but 
then ‘commands’ the market into filling in the substantive content of that regulation.31 
It is commonly regarded, mainly from within the field of neo-classical economics,32 
as a more efficient rule-making approach, as against the perceived deficiencies of 
state promulgated law,33 based upon the overarching theory of ‘reflexive law’.34 At its 
heart, reflexive law seeks to mobilise the integrative capacities of the markets and 
institutions outside the legal system to control companies’ adverse socio-economic 
behaviour in the marketplace.  There are powerful economic arguments for the 
application of reflexive law strategies to corporate regulation, 35  which cohere to 
political theories rooted in autonomy and the promotion of individual freedom of 
                                                             
29 For some useful critical works on neoliberalism, see R. Plant, The Neoliberal State (OUP, 2010); D. 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP, 2007); N. Chomsky, Profit Over People: 
Neoliberalism and Global Order (Seven Stories Press, 1998). 
30  J. N. Rosenau, ‘Governing the Ungovernable: The Challenge of a Global Disaggregation of 
Authority’ (2007) 1(1) Regulation and Governance 88, 88.  See also, S. Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing 
Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 457; B. Lange, 
‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ (2003) 12(4) Social & Legal Studies 411, 413. 
31 This definition follows closely the one provided in Kershaw, above n 1, Part IV.  It can be contrasted 
with ‘self-regulation’, which, as Julia Black has remarked, implies no particular relationship with the 
state.  See J. Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ (1989) 59(1) Modern Law Review 24, 27. 
32 See e.g. C. Sunstein, ‘The Paradoxes of Regulation’ (1990) 67 University of Chicago Law Review 
408. 
33 J. Black, ‘Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 
75(6) Modern Law Review 1037, 1038.   
34 The pioneering article is G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements of Modern Law’ (1983) 
17 Law and Society Review 239.  See also, G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwells, 
1993) at Ch. 5; R. M. Unger, ‘Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination’ (1996) 59(1) Modern Law 
Review 1.   
35 Ibid.   
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choice – and, importantly, while implicating some kind of normative commitment, do 
not rely on the imposition of binding standards or on a regime of formal sanctions.36  
 
Placed in historical context, in the UK Parliament has consciously and deliberately 
entrusted certain important rule design and enforcement responsibilities to market-
based regulatory regimes. 37  These regulatory forms are customarily regarded as 
hybrid state/market bodies, which provide scope for flexibility, diversity, and opt-out 
at the point of intra-corporate application. 38  While these alternative mechanism 
diverge considerably in micro-institutional identities and drivers, these lower order 
rule-sets reveal two ultimate and coherent functions for society.  This common 
purpose, to a large extent, complements the abovementioned role and function of the 
higher order rules of company law.  The UK’s market-based regulation attempts in 
general to leverage the market’s knowledge and information advantages to coordinate 
and enforce the ‘rules of the game’ governing the rights, relations, and conduct of, 
and within, listed companies whose shares are admitted to trading on the London 
Stock Exchange.39 Second, it is in general designed to protect the integrity of the UK 
equity markets from market misconduct in order to mitigate the information 
asymmetry problems and agency costs incurred by shareholders in listed companies.40 
The interests of other socio-economic market participants extraneous to 
                                                             
36 The classic accounts of Hayek’s distinction between constructed legal rules and decentralised law 
are: F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Routledge, 1973) 72-91; F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 
(Routledge, 1944) 75-90.  Compare the work of legal realist scholars who, nearly a century ago, 
revealed the public legal underpinnings of private economic power.  See e.g. M. R. Cohen, ‘Property 
and Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell Law Review 8. 
37 See e.g. A. Fox, History and Heritage: The Social Origins of the British Industrial Relations System 
(Allen & Unwin, 1985).  
38 Moore, above n 5, 167. 
39 Kershaw, above n 1, 869. 
40 Lord Alexander of Weedon, ‘Judicial Review and City Regulators’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 
640, 647; B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (OUP, 1997) 18.   
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considerations of shareholder welfare are in general of secondary importance.41 No 
doubt, it would be inaccurate to suppose that company law does not ‘matter’ in some 
way to the background state of legal normality against which many areas of corporate 
life take place.  However, market-based solutions have emerged to help increasingly 
structure and coordinate productivity organized in companies, and this prompts 
questions about what is the relationship between law and regulation. 
 
This regulatory impact is most evident where, as explained above, Parliament has 
deferred lawmaking competence to the market because it neither has the time, nor the 
interest, nor the expertise.  Yet it is also the case where there is proactive intervention 
or role for law central to the control and enforcement of socially suboptimal 
behaviour, but which the legal rules in question are articulated in only the barest form.  
Framing important legal questions and issues around seemingly indeterminate legal 
doctrines and legal decisions is thus viewed often, and understandably, as somewhat 
limited in effectiveness and outlook.  Importantly, in order to interpret and apply the 
rules in question, it might be tempting for policy-makers or practitioners to draw upon 
more workable and consistent criteria set forth in market-based regulation.  These 
alternative sources have the potential to be used to identify the functions, and context-
specific expectations, of directors when fleshing out what should be or should not be 
done.  For our purposes, therefore, market-based rule production might be used not 
simply as ‘an affair of technical bureaucratic minutiae, the thrust and parry of setting 
                                                             
41 For example, not all concerned parties necessarily have input into the formulation of market-based 
regulatory products.  To some extent, this deficit can be addressed through appropriate consultative 
processes by standard setting bodies.  However, perhaps because of a common investor-protectionist 
ethos of these regulatory bodies, transparency or participation for non-members has not typically been 
a priority.  In a similar way, the rights of citizens are indirectly affected by, say, the Takeover Panel’s 
decisions and, arguably, only those owning securities may in a technical sense be said to have assented 
to the situation.  On this second point, see R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p. Datafin [1987] 2 
WLR 699, as per Lord Donaldson MR at 838. 
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agendas, framing issues, and deciding priorities’,42 but also to ‘manage the tensions 
between the ‘social’ and ‘economic’ goals of modern democracies, tensions that 
enflame passionate and highly wrought political conflict over the ethical limits of 
global capitalism.’ 43  There is already some evidence of such an approach.  
Accordingly, what follows is a brief outline of the UK’s empirically significant 
market-based regulatory creations, but only to the extent necessary to explain the 
substantive area they are regulating and the interaction with the substantive law.  
More will be said later in the article about the institutional arrangements of market-
based forms and how their relationship to the state, and their legitimacy, is calibrated 
through these arrangements.   
 
The Corporate Governance Code 
The FRC’s Corporate Governance Code applies, on a ‘comply or explain’ basis,44 to 
all companies that have their shares publicly quoted in the UK.45 First introduced in 
1992, it goes further than closely reflecting existing boardroom practices, and has, for 
example, shifted incrementally, then radically, board composition and separation 
practices.  In the absence of direct attention by UK company law,46 the Code has been 
primarily concerned with providing independent governance recommendations that 
address the structure and function of the board as a disciplinary device.  It addresses, 
in particular, corporate culture, the division of executive and non-executive directors; 
                                                             
42 B. Morgan, ‘The Economization of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial Legality’ 
(2003) 12(4) Social & Legal Studies 489, 490. 
43 Ibid. 
44 The Listing Rules and Listing Requirements reinforce the Code’s voluntary status.  See Listing Rules 
9.8.6(5)-9.8.6(6).  
45 See UK Corporate Governance Code <https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-
95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf>. 
46 Although the Companies Act 2006 stipulates the minimum number, and age, of directors in a public 
or private company, the statute remains silent on internal governance arrangements generally, 
preferring instead to leave such matters to be decided at the intra-firm level.   
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board and committee structure and staffing of these committees; remuneration 
guidance; and internal controls.47 Although the latest version now provides, for the 
first time since its inception, regulatory recognition of the importance of non-
shareholder corporate stakeholders,48 a pro-shareholder regulatory residue arguably 
remains an important stimulus of how the FRC understands its role in the corporate 
governance edifice.49 Consider, for example, the continuing importance attached to 
the views of major shareholders in respect to governance and performance,50  the 
senior non-executive director’s role as intermediary for the other directors and 
shareholders, 51  and the various sub-committees’ main role and responsibility to 
provide pertinent information to, or engage with, shareholders collectively. 52 
Furthermore, while listed companies have no choice but to comply with the Code, 
they can choose to adopt a different approach if that is more appropriate to their 
circumstances.  Where they do so, however, they are required to explain the reason, 
through their annual report, to the markets generally and, in particular, their 
shareholders, who assess and respond to non-compliance through the credible threat 
of ‘voice’ or ‘exit’.53 The Code thus facilitates agency cost-reducing mechanisms 
designed to engender investor empowerment and investor confidence in the board’s 
                                                             
47 The Corporate Governance Code 2018, Sections 1-5.   
48  The 2018 version of the Code essentially takes its lead from the Green Paper consultation on 
Corporate Governance: BEIS, Corporate Governance Reform (November 2016).  See e.g. The 
Corporate Governance Code 2018, Introduction.   
49 Of course, since 2014 the Code has instructed boards ‘to present a fair, balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company’s position’, the so-called ‘viability statement’, which might be regarded as 
permitting creditors and suppliers to companies to assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.  However, the presumptive recipients of the audit, risk, and internal control 
recommendations are primarily the company’s shareholders, a fact that is reflected in the Code’s 
express stipulation that this information, set forth in the annual report, ‘is necessary for shareholders to 
assess the company’s position, performance, business model and strategy.’ See The Corporate 
Governance Code 2018, 4.26-27. 
50 Ibid, 1.3. 
51 Ibid, 2.12. 
52 Ibid, e.g. 4.25, 4.27, 5.41. 
53 On the relative effectiveness of controlling management in this regard, see e.g. J. Parkinson, ‘The 
Role of ‘Exit’ and ‘Voice’ in Corporate Governance’ in S. Sheikh and W. Rees (eds) Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control (Cavendish, 1995) Ch. 3. 
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activities and contributions by increasing the accountability of directors to 
shareholders. 54  Although nothing in the Code overrides or is intended as an 
interpretation of directors’ duties, its weighted shareholder presence has already 
influenced the courts’ interpretive role in various cases.  For example, recent case law 
has begun to use market-based criteria about a director’s function and role in order to 
understand the substantive expectations generated by the duty of care obligation.55 
Similarly, directors in the UK are customarily focused on shareholder value through 
higher share prices, and an apparent benefit of complying with the Code is an optimal 
(or at least relatively high) share price.56 
 
The Listing Rules and Listing Requirements 
A company must adhere to the FCA’s Listing Rules and Listing Requirements in 
order to maintain a full listing on the London Stock Exchange. 57  This financial 
regulatory device encompasses a set of market-based, but contractually-supported, 
obligations applied to premium listed companies, and is subject to the oversight of the 
UK Listing Authority.  In some sense the primary focus of the Listing Rules on 
ensuring the integrity of financial markets and capital formation might be viewed as 
having a public policy effect because an increasing amount of the population’s non-
                                                             
54  The Cadbury Report, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) available at 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf>.  
55 Perhaps the most prominent example can be found in Secretary of State for Trade and Indusrty v 
Baker (Re Barings) [1999] 1 BCLC 433.  In the Australian context, see Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Rich 44 ACSR 431 (2003); ASIC v Healey 278 ALR 618 (2011). 
56  A. Keay, ‘‘Comply or explain’ in corporate governance codes: in need of greater regulatory 
oversight?’ (2014) 34(2) Legal Studies 279, 283. 
57  See UK Listing Rules <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf>. For an in-depth 
discussion and analysis of the Listing Rules and Listing Requirements, see generally E. Ferran and L. 
Chan Ho, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (OUP, 2nd edn, 2014) Ch. 13. 
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occupational income provision now relies on equity markets.58 However, it is today 
the investment intermediaries, rather than ultimate contributors to equity, which have 
become putative stewards over corporate governance.  This growth of intermediation 
has led primarily to an increased potential for misaligned incentives and a tendency to 
view market effectiveness through the eyes of intermediaries.59 Against this backdrop, 
the Listing Rules require contain a number of central corporate governance rules and 
the ‘comply-or-explain’ obligation underlying the Corporate Governance Code is also 
to be found there.  The current rules contain six overarching ‘Listing Principles’ as 
well as detailed continuing obligation rules in areas such as regulatory notifications,60 
annual financial reports, 61  corporate governance. 62  The basic control is ex ante 
disclosure to the markets generally and the company’s shareholders specifically, on 
which it is incumbent to determine whether the response of the company to the 
Listing Rules does enough and then take some action if they do not.  For example, 
financial information must be disclosed to domestic and overseas investors in order to 
assist them to make active and properly informed decisions about a company’s 
financial position, and ensure the pricing of shares in the market is based on adequate 
and accurate information.  In Listing Rule 10, moreover, shareholder approval is 
imposed exogenously on all economically significant transactions. 63  Because 
shareholder voting is mandatory and binding, rather than a choice variable of the 
                                                             
58 On this generally, see M. Gelter, ‘The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy’ (2013) 
43 Seton Hall Law Review 909, 911.  For earlier and similar thinking on this issue, see A. A. Berle, 
‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365, 1368. 
59 J. Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long Term Decision Making (2012) Executive 
Summary, point x < 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2534
54/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf>.  See also, R. J. Gilson and J. N. 
Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of 
Governance Rights’ (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 863. 
60 Listing Rules 9.6 and 15.6. 
61 Listing Rule 9.8. 
62 Listing Rules (mainly) 7, 9, and 15. 
63 But also in the case of all UK-registered companies, see the CA 2006, ss 177, 182, and 190-196.   
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board or management, it acts as a practically effective lever of board accountability.  
Ultimately, while the Listing Rules, until relatively recently, had a much more direct 
impact on the terms of a listed company’s constitution,64 these rules have, over the 
years, driven the terms of engagement between a listed company and its 
shareholders.65  
 
The Takeover Code 
For directors of UK listed, or widely-held private, companies that are involved in 
changes of corporate control, the Takeover Code provides the main domestic 
regulatory framework.66 The application of the rules is reinforced mainly by the threat 
of reputational administrative sanctions for non-compliance, with only limited 
available recourse to the courts.67 Although the Code has been amended over time 
since its inception, its central provisions have not been altered in substance.  Today’s 
Code is an interventionist and onerous body of six general principles and more 
specific supplementary rules, which proceed on the basis of ensuring the efficiency 
and procedural fairness of a bid from the perspective of the shareholders.68 In the 
                                                             
64 R. Nolan, ‘The Continuing Evolution of Shareholder Governance’ (2006) 65(1) Cambridge Law 
Journal 92, 112. 
65 I. MacNeil and A. Lau, ‘International Corporate Regulation: Listing Rules and Overseas Companies’ 
(2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 787.  On the continuing importance of Listing 
Rule 10, see M. Becht, A. Polo, and S. Rossi, ‘Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad 
Acquisitions?’ (2016) 29(11) 3035. 
66  See The Takeover Code <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=1Apr2019>. On the historical origins and early development of 
the Takeover Code, see D. Kershaw, Principles of Takeover Regulation (OUP, 2016); A. Johnston, The 
City Takeover Code (OUP, 1980). 
67  L. Hilliard, ‘The Takeover Panel and the Courts’ (1987) 50 Modern Law Review 372, 378, 
remarking that, ‘[d]espite the potentially wide ambit of Datafin, clearly in future the courts will not 
wish to supervise the activities of every decision-making body in the country.’  Support for this point is 
found in an excellent analysis of the law in Black, above n 31, 32-43. 
68 For an academic commentary, see J. Armour and D. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why?’ The Peculiar Divergence of US and US Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 
Georgetown Law Journal 1727, 1730. 
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wake of Kraft’s takeover of Cadbury in 2010,69 the views of employees now receive 
some prominence,70 but such changes in general remain ‘a halfway house’.71 Properly 
understood, the Code remains ‘ambivalent regarding the treatment of non-shareholder 
stakeholders.’72 Against this pro-shareholder backdrop, the most important obligations 
of the Code’s provisions include: the requirement of similar treatment of shareholders 
of a particular class, 73  the requirement of full and accurate information for 
shareholders,74 and the avoidance of a false market, which is sought through requiring 
full disclosure of transactions to the company’s shareholders. 75  One cannot 
underestimate the fact, moreover, that shareholders collectively are entitled to 
exercise the final ‘say’ over the outcome of a contested takeover bid by virtue of the 
so-called ‘board neutrality’ rule. 76  This managerial authority-limiting rule is a 
powerful driver of an open market for corporate control, which is customarily 
regarded as a core mechanism for aligning directors’ interests with those of the 
company’s shareholders.77 Andrew Johnston observed in this regard that the Code’s 
priorities ‘reflect the fact that, historically, the primary concern of the drafters of the 
                                                             
69  B. Morris, ‘The Cadbury Deal: How it Changed Takeovers’, BBC (May 2, 2014), 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27258143>. 
70 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rules 2.7, 2.9, 20, 24, 25, and 30. 
71 W. Hutton, C. Mayer, and P. Schneider, ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Shareholder Rights’  (2017) 40 
Seattle University Law Review 375, 395. 
72 L. Rybak, ‘Takeover Regulation and Inclusive Corporate Governance: A Social-Choice Theoretical 
Analysis’ (2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 407, 408.    
73 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule 11.1 (which fleshes out General Principle 1).  
74 Ibid, Rule 21.3 (which fleshes out General Principle 2).   
75 Ibid, Rule 2.2 (which fleshes out General Principle 4).   
76 Ibid, Rule 21 (which fleshes out General Principle 3).  Although company law’s proper purpose 
doctrine, as set out under CA 2006, s 171, provides purposive constraints on post-bid corporate action 
primarily intended to have a defensive effect, it does not, unlike Rule 21, prohibit defences that have a 
defensive impact but which can be characterised as non-defensive business decisions.  On this point, 
see D. Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition’ 
(2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 267, 289. 
77 See e.g. H. Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 Journal of Political 
Economy 110.  What is more, the Takeover Code has, in its time, had an impact on the development of 
the common law.  See, for example, Gething v Kilner [1972] 1 WLR 337; R. v Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers ex.p. Datafin plc [1987] 2 WLR 699; R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex.p. Guiness 
[1989] 1 Sll ER 509. 
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Code was to maintain investor confidence in the City rather than to improve standards 
of corporate governance generally [emphasis added].’78  
 
Summary of market-based regulation 
On the article’s first question about legal-regulatory ‘fit’, UK company law and 
market-based rules, rather than being framed as antagonistic alternatives, or mutually 
exclusive directions of travel, work together in a number of core institutions of the 
UK’s company law and governance, albeit with carefully defined, essentially 
consistent, and mutually complementary roles.  These functions are to establish 
efficient building blocks of productivity organised in companies, understood as 
looking for rules and structures that maximise shareholder value by reducing the 
agency costs between directors and shareholders.  However, this analysis poses in a 
conspicuous form the limits or edges of the law’s effectiveness and outlook.  This 
includes the contexts in which market mechanisms address areas of corporate activity 
that are clearly not covered by company law.  Moreover, in other areas where both 
regulatory systems overlap in relation to their areas of rule production and 
enforcement, it is evident that the substantive law has sometimes remained curiously 
indeterminate.  On this basis, at least in respect to listed companies, certain basic 
background rules of company law become little more than a rough ‘freehand drawing’ 
onto which the more dynamic and semi-autonomous market-based regulation has the 
                                                             
78 A. Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ (2007) 
66(2) Cambridge Law Journal 422, 451.   It is important to note, however, that there exists wide 
disagreement about the nature and drivers of the Code.  The literature on the Takeover Code has one 
strong view that institutional investors captured this regulatory space, while another looks to the 
influence of investment bankers.  See, respectively, J. Armour and D. Skeel Jr., ‘Who Writes the Rules 
for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 
95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727; Kershaw, above n 66, Ch. 3. 
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potential to ‘paint’ definition and colour as reflected in the expected preferences of 
advisors and their clients.  If this is a plausible assessment of the likelihood of 
regulatory ‘spread’, then it is arguably clear that its normative and value-laden 
shareholder presence portends to structure and amplify shareholder interests and value 
pressures, which is likely to further reduce management insulation from shareholder 
value pressures.79 The main problem about market-based regulation in this regard is 
that it too readily transforms controversial objectives and political issues into 
questions of rulemaking for hybrid state/market regulators.  In this way, it takes 
critical decision-making powers out of the political process.  Since that process is the 
only way the general population is able to engage, however indirectly, in the shaping 
of law, this is arguably contentious from a democratic legitimacy perspective.   
 
D. ON THE POLITICAL LEGITIMACY QUESTION 
Following on from the analysis above, the second, and substantive, question to be 
addressed in this article centres on the idea that the way in which companies are 
governed, and the way such governance is perceived, contributes centrally to the 
political legitimacy and democratic accountability of companies’ regulation and this 
underpins both the acceptance and the effects of corporate activity.  At any time, an 
inquiry into the legitimacy and accountability of the regulator constituencies is 
worthwhile.  However, the different ways in which alternative regulatory forms have 
come, either formally or in practice, to mould and influence the field of company law 
reveals a more pressing dimension.  Accordingly, the question can be put as follows: 
do these ostensibly independent and apparently politically neutral-technocratic 
                                                             
79 H. Muir-Watt, ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’ (2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 
347, 347. 
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regulatory formations retain a firm basis on which to rest their continuing legitimacy?  
As this question immediately suggests, a great deal depends on how we understand 
the concept of law’s ‘legitimacy’. The organising principles of public law, namely, 
political and democratic theory, provide us with a useful framework for thinking 
about questions of legitimacy.  This understanding tends to be deployed to explain or 
justify normatively the institutional legitimacy and deliberative quality of state 
interventionist functions.80 Although company law is not customarily characterised as 
an aspect of ‘public’ law, this approach is appropriate because a closer inspection 
reveals that much of the rulebook that affects the UK’s system of company law is 
regulatory or ‘non-private’ in nature.81 It is emphasised, by way of disclaimer, that 
this section does not seek to flesh out all aspects of the political legitimacy of law, 
which would not be possible in one article of limited length.  At appropriate points the 
section identifies existing literature that provides further treatment.   
 
(i) Framing the research enquiry 
The first task, then, is to identify what we mean when we talk about democratic 
criteria or, more aptly, democratic theory, which is an established subfield of political 
theory.  Without too great an over-simplification, the literature is concerned primarily 
with examining central descriptive questions about how policy or law is made, and by 
whom, but also seeks to realise realistic normative accounts that show us the moderate 
standards to which we ought to be holding our lawmaking.  Against a backdrop of 
relatively settled ideas about the rule of law and the separation of powers (especially 
                                                             
80 There is a long list of works in this tradition; perhaps the most prominent examples include: R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (HUP, 1977); R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (HUP, 1986). See also, J. 
Raz, Authority of Law (OUP, 1979).   
81 See generally, Moore, above n 5; M. Stokes, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in W. Twining (ed.), 
Common Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell, 1986) 155. 
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the independence of the judiciary), explanations and predictions of democratic theory 
are typically diffused across a variety of academic disciplines and methodological 
orientations.  Correspondingly, there exists broad disagreement about the relative 
importance of the notion of participation between, and amongst, the theories of earlier 
writers (the so-called ‘classical theorists’) 82 and the more recent work (of ‘liberal’ 
social scientists).83 Generally speaking, early democratic theorists subscribe in the 
main to the view that the capacity for collective self-governance must be realised 
through participation, although one could infer that a delegation of sovereignty by the 
people to elected officials – as a ‘second-best’ – is invariably assumed.84 However, 
the typical starting point for more contemporary theories of democracy see little scope 
for full participation in the vast complexities of modern governance where technical 
competence, administrative expertise, and executive decisions are needed.  When 
viewed through the influential writing of Joseph Schumpeter, all which is entailed for 
democracy to work effectively is that enough citizens participate to keep the 
institutional arrangements working satisfactorily.85 The focus of his theory is, instead, 
on the minority of leaders, who must be active, initiate, and decide, and it is 
competition between leaders for votes that is the characteristically democratic 
element in this political method.  Whatever the differences between democratic 
criteria, all of these theories share a basic commitment to ‘input-legitimate’ governing 
processes, which are derived from the aggregate pluralistic preferences of the 
population at large, and that specific ‘output-legitimate’ institutional arrangements are 
                                                             
82 See the likes of J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (M. W. Cranston (trans)) (Penguin, 1967); J. S. 
Mill, Representative Government (Everyman, 1910). 
83 The most obvious example is J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Allen & 
Unwin, 1943).  An understanding of the nature of Schumpeter’s theory is vital for an appreciation of 
more recent work in democratic theory, in which his established analytical framework and definition of 
democracy have all become almost universally accepted.  More or less an example of this is R. Dahl, 
After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (YUP, 1970). 
84 C.  Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (CUP, 1976) 28 (discussing, in particular, the 
later work of J. S. Mill).   
85 Schumpeter, above n 83, 283.     
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conducive to policy choices that are generally acceptable in terms of consensual 
notions of the public interest.86 The concepts of input and output-legitimacy, taken 
together, constitute the solidaristic prerequisites in debates about what makes 
substantive company law politically legitimate and democratically accountable.   
 
(ii) The political legitimacy of law 
Typically the UK’s traditions of legal and political thought reflect the idea that 
‘[m]uch of what legitimates [substantive] law and distinguishes it from other forms of 
normativity are the processes by which it is created and applied – adherence to legal 
process values, the ability of actors to participate and feel their influence, and the use 
of legal forms of reasoning [emphasis added].’87 Consider, for example, the UK’s 
primary legislation relating to corporate activity, which is, it will be recalled, the 
Companies Act 2006.  As a product of Parliamentary lawmaking, it derives a 
substantial part of its input-legitimacy from the formal elements of the rule of law, 
processes of consensual democracy, and the role of the courts as the ultimate authority 
on the meaning of legislation.  Typically, when we think about how the rule of law 
supports and nourishes the legitimacy of the English legal system we look at its 
restriction of the arbitrary exercise of power by subordinating it to well-defined and 
established laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently 
adjudicated.  The formal and procedural pre-requisites of the rule of law are ‘designed 
to ensure the authoritative legal rule is capable of ruling, and that is it is clear, 
                                                             
86 This distinction was developed by Fritz Scharpf during the 1970s, and is utilised here as it is 
generally a useful distinction for analysing issues of legitimacy.  For a useful synopsis, see F. Scharpf, 
Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP, 1999) 6-10. 
87 M. Finnemore and S. J. Toope, ‘Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics’ 
(2001) 55(3) International Organization 743, 750. 
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prospective, general, relatively stable and so forth.’88 On this account, the rule of law 
ensures corporate life or a substantive review of the corporate framework is ruled by 
law, order, and (in the formal sense) justice – not executive whim, not financial 
influence, and not partisan zealotry.  The standard view of the rule of law is, 
therefore, that it preserves political legitimacy and accountability.  
 
What is more, the UK’s political agenda and decision-making process itself must 
achieve compliance and conformity from the regulated constituencies themselves.  
Undoubtedly, consensual democracy underpins the consensus-based decision-making 
process of the design and enforcement of corporate legal rules.  As a general rule, 
reaching consensus, especially as far as different societal goals are concerned, is a 
characteristic feature of modern democracies.  In addition to taking into account as 
broad a range of opinions as possible, legislatures are democratically elected and 
accountable bodies.  Their members are elected as legislators and they can be replaced 
at regular intervals if their constituents dislike what they or their political party are 
doing in the legislature.89 Yet the state must not only generate and enforce its rules in 
a deliberative, impartial, and procedurally correct way.  From an output-perspective, 
meanwhile, the state must also ensure that it provides solutions for the society in 
which it functions.90 Indeed, the legislature in the UK, and elsewhere, has long been 
required to assess ex ante the potential effects of proposed laws through regulatory 
                                                             
88 J. A. Grant, ‘The Ideals of the Rule of Law’ (2017) 37(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 383, 384.  
Some earlier examples of this point include: J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtues’ (1977) 93 Law 
Quarterly Review 195, 199-201; L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (YUP, 1964) esp. Ch. 2. 
89 See e.g. J. Waldron, ‘Representative Lawmking’ (2009) 89 Boston University Law Review 335, 335; 
J. Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346, 1361.   
90 Scharpf, above n 86, 10.  See also, W. Sadurski, ‘Law’s Legitimacy and ‘Democracy-Plus’’ (2006) 
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analysis91 and wide consultation of the proposed benefits of the legal intervention, as 
well as Parliamentary scrutiny.92 Eilis Ferran, with a paper published in 2005, opines 
that, ‘modern theories of good governance emphasise the consultation and 
collaboration as techniques that can enhance legitimacy of rules and the 
accountability of the rule-makers.  Experience in the UK company law review is 
certainly supportive of the legitimacy-enhancing function performed by 
consultation.’93 
 
In spite of Parliament being the ultimate source of legal authority, there are in 
practical terms significant limitations on its sovereignty because of a separation of 
powers.94 As the final interpreters of companies’ legislation, the courts perform the 
important constitutional function of reconciling the legislative direction with the true 
meaning of the statute and, hence, its consequences for the resolution of particular 
company law cases.95 Of course, the judiciary, though acting in the name of the 
Crown, is an unelected and formally independent branch of government.  While an 
important element of the separation of powers, it opens up the court, particularly in 
the context strike down powers, to the familiar charge that it is thus inherently 
                                                             
91 Petrin, above n 2, 537 (and accompanying footnotes). 
92 The most recent major company law reform project in the UK took place between 1998-2002 and 
culminated in the Companies Act 2006.  The three main consultation documents were: Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (London, DTI, URN 99/654, 
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URN 00/656, 2000); and Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the 
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93 E. Ferran, ‘Company Law Reform in the UK: A Progress Report’ (2005) ECGI Law Working Paper 
27/2005, 33 < https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id644203.pdf>. 
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separation of powers, see M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (OUP, 1967) 
3ff.   For a the less strict or rigid separation between the branches than the orthodox account would 
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(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (OUP, 2015) 221. 
95 Allan, above n 21, 157. 
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democratically illegitimate.96 Clearly, there are important reasons of political thought 
and democratic principal that cast doubt on the propriety of giving the courts a 
company law-making function.  Yet it would be a mistake not to recognise that the 
court’s political legitimacy depends precisely on its distinctiveness from political 
branches, albeit subject to orthodox and fundamentally similar conventions and 
baselines.  Indeed, much of what has been said in the paragraph above is just as true 
of the common law, in the sense that corporate legal adjudication is framed by an 
important collection of input-oriented references to legal analogy, legal history, 
convention, the force of justice, and social welfare.97 In particular, the courts tend to 
interpret and apply rigidly the prescriptions of the legislature, or the generalised 
principles deduced from a series of precedents, to individual disputes, which must be 
fitted into the existing body of the law.98  
 
The common law tradition of settling disputes by reference principally to pre-existing 
corporate legal doctrine and legal decisions has deep and broad appeal within the 
tradition of liberal political thought.  For H.L.A. Hart, the judge’s role is best 
analogised to the ‘delegated rulemaking power [of] an administrative body.’99 In this 
model, courts have authority to make, or amend, rules for unregulated cases and are 
instructed to do so with reference to the principles and standards established in the 
authoritative provisions.  Hart further argued that ‘legal decision-making does not 
proceed in vacuo but always against a background of a system of relatively well 
                                                             
96 Waldron, above n 89, 1346; M. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social 
Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (PUP, 2008) Ch. 2.  Cf. R. H. Fallon, Jr, ‘The Core 
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97 P. Winfield, ‘Public Policy in the English Common Law’ (1929) 42 Harvard Law Review 76, 76. 
98 See sources cited in nn 22-23 above (and accompanying text). 
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established rules, principles, standards, and values.’ 100  Of equal relevance are 
relatively recent accounts about the democratic foundations of common law 
reasoning: forensic, transparent, reflective of historical social values, rooted in a 
concept of individual rights, and so forth.101 Others have sought to show that judge-
made law can itself become a valuable channel of political participation and thus to 
agitate for legal change, especially for those who are marginalised and disempowered 
in the normal political process.102 From the output perspective, the legal decisions 
generated by the courts must cohere with the ongoing expression of public values.  
This point is well articulated by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, who remarked obiter 
that, ‘[f]or centuries, judges have been charged with the responsibility of keeping this 
[the common law] abreast of current social conditions.’103 Accordingly, if a court gets 
out of sync with the legal and political culture, its pronouncements risk being ignored 
or over-ruled by the legislature.  So understood, this awareness of the political context 
is an important component of a court’s output-legitimacy in company law cases.   
 
(iii) The political legitimacy of market-based regulation 
From the analysis above, it is evident that the UK’s company law, which is a product 
of social organisation, necessarily, therefore, derives authority and political legitimacy 
from fundamental pre-requisites of authoritative adjudication and legislation in 
addition to those relating to a judge’s or legislature’s formal entitlement to adjudicate 
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or legislate.  These pre-requisites essentially rest on public democratic criteria and 
accountability, such as deliberative, impartial, and appropriate process-oriented 
‘inputs’.  Simultaneously, this understanding of legitimacy is instantiated through 
rule-based ‘outputs’ that aims to protect both shareholders and, to an extent, the 
public interest in the effective functioning of wealth generating companies.104 On the 
contrary, market-based regulatory formations typically combine the institutional 
structure and function of state company and capital markets rulemaking with the 
paradoxical incentives and interests of the most important rule-users in the 
marketplace.  Accordingly, there might be a problem with this article’s attempt to 
inscribe the dominant understanding of legitimacy in regulation.  The understanding 
might not actually work as a general structuring principle for market regulatory bodies 
because their institutional and administrative workings do not readily or plausibly sit 
within conventional patterns of the rule of law, consensual democracy, and 
accountability to the courts.  No doubt, the quality of outcomes-focused or outcomes-
based approaches to the exercise of regulatory power, as we will see, is less 
contentious because of apparent technocratic or elite expertise, efficiency gains, and 
purposive flexibility.  On the input side, however, the practical operation and rule 
control of these alternative regulatory systems takes the risk of being at odds with 
democratic or policy-based criteria, as well as a substantial body of academic theory 
and, accordingly, is more likely in practice to undermine and inhibit their perceived 
authority and legitimacy.  
 
Due to the micro-institutional identities and drivers of the UK’s respective regulatory 
formations, there is not one but many versions of rulemaking body, which tend to 
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comprise varying iterations of institutional-functional formality and invariably engage 
distinct linear points between the public/private poles.105 Even if the argument at play 
here does not pin down a regulator archetype, it remains tempting to view the varied 
regulatory authorities charged with drafting and enforcement powers as having been 
formed by or are connected to the state.  Consider, first, the FCA, which, as the UK’s 
official listing authority, is (and always has been) an independent body created by 
statute, namely, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 106  The FCA is 
responsible for writing and enforcing the Listing Rules of the London Stock 
Exchange, which have the status of delegated legislation.  In this regard, the body is 
accountable to the Treasury, and to Parliamentary scrutiny.  In contrast, the FRC is at 
the present moment in time formally a non-governmental body that is constituted on a 
private sector basis in the form of a company by guarantee.  However, public 
administrative dynamics are inscribed informally insofar as the British government 
confers statutory authority under the Companies Act 2006 to update the Corporate 
Governance Code.107 Simultaneously, its Chair and Deputy Chair are appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy.  In spite of the 
enduring refusal of successive UK governments to displace the perceived prerogative 
of the FRC to determine the substantive content of the Code, it now seems likely that 
it will be replaced with an independent statutory regulator with new powers, 
accountable to Parliament, and named the Audit, Reporting and Governance 
Authority (ARGA).108 Finally, The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers is a private body, 
similar to the FRC, upon which statutory functions in relation to takeover bids have 
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been conferred under the Companies Act 2006.109 This means the rules set out in the 
Code have a statutory basis and apply to takeover bids or merger transactions of 
public and private companies in the UK.  On this basis, the Panel and the Department 
for Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy coordinate loosely with one another 
on important issues relating to takeover policy and regulation.  Overall, the 
institutional and functional approach to determining ‘public-ness’ of the regulator 
constituencies, conceived as the domain of the state, is ultimately conducive to 
presenting these regulatory forms as expressly authorised and structured by formal 
governmental interference or influence in a strictly technical sense.   
 
To many, this institutional and functional analysis as a general structuring principle 
for market-based regulators may portend to the end of the story.  Is the body in 
question part of the government?  And is the process, conduct, or decision in question 
one typically public or discharged by government?  In short, most of these regulatory 
bodies have evolved into agencies that have a more clearly-defined public dimension.  
However, a closer inspection of how these alternative regulatory bodies both organise 
and operate (relative to the UK’s substantive company law-making bodies) raises 
significant doubt about what it is that gives them their input-legitimacy and in what 
ways they can be held accountable.  Although the state often seeks to achieve its 
regulatory objectives by conferring a mixture of statutory functions and limited 
delegated powers whilst simultaneously maintaining formal oversight of the 
regulation, in doing so it takes the risk that the regulator’s practical inner workings 
and control of the rules may bias the rule detail and rule orientation in favour of 
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primary rule-users who are subject to its regulatory authority.110 In particular, certain 
of the most influential rule-making bodies in UK corporate governance, such as the 
FRC and the Takeover Panel, are controlled by market participants, with a majority of 
appointed board members from the business and accounting worlds and, at best, only 
a minority of delegated representatives from other regulators or government. 111 
Similarly, when we think about how the Takeover Panel’s executive, for example, 
staffs itself, it becomes difficult to ignore the fact that it comprises limited full-time 
staff, with mainly secondees drawn from a spread of institutional shareholder, 
corporate practitioner, and other financial institutions within the Panel’s regulated 
community.  What is more, charging fees and levies to the firms and market actors 
who are subject, or have regard to, or benefit from market-based rules and 
enforcement typically funds these regulatory bodies.112 By providing the market with 
such a key role in regulatory control and funding we might have valid public choice 
concerns that the rules will become tilted toward the financial institutions that are 
broadly representative of the City establishment’s institutional shareholder and 
associated professional communities. 113   Ultimately, the investigation in this 
subsection turns on the survival and operational public/private distinction of the 
regulator constituencies and, once identified, it is tempting to the see the market’s 
practical input into the design and enforcement of various rules and practices as 
unavoidably weighted towards the interests of (private) business and market 
participants rather than the (public) formal and procedural pre-requisites of the rule of 
law. 
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Correspondingly, in spite of the separation of powers being a pervasive feature of the 
UK’s exercise of legal power to form and tailor the rules of corporate life,114 there are 
valid reservations about an equivalent system of ‘checks and balances’ in the realm of 
market regulation.115 The continuation of a democratic ‘overhead’, described above, 
purportedly extends a form of democratic control from more traditional institutions 
over the new unelected bodies.  Yet we have seen the attempt to extend democratic 
controls takes the risk of being undermined by the market’s presumptive and actual 
control of the exercise of regulatory power. 116  Moreover, if we look inside the 
respective bodies’ particular constitutional structures, and the participative 
procedures, the problem of regulatory capture, and so less accountability, risks 
feeding through into institutional design.  Let us consider the perceived concerns in a 
little more detail.  On the Takeover Panel, for example, the Panel, its Executive, and 
various Committees, subdivide substantive responsibilities for writing, adjudicating, 
and enforcing the Code.  The informal ex ante rulings of the Hearings Committee can 
be appealed to the independent Takeover Appeal Board.117 Similarly, although the 
FCA is constituted, directed, and controlled by its board, comprised of executive and 
non-executive directors, it delegates certain functions/powers to the CEO and/or 
several committees (e.g. auditing, risk and strategy).  Any company may apply to an 
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independent Upper Tribunal for a review of any of the rules made by the FCA or to 
check whether it came to the correct view of the law.118 There is, taken together, 
apparently a latent, but embryonic, separation of powers of, and within, the distinct 
branches of the The Takeover Panel and the FCA.  However, the fact remains that 
almost all of the regulator constituencies, however formally or practically partitioned, 
tend to be comprised of a relatively homogenous group of people with industry 
knowledge, and their careers tend to follow the ‘revolving door’ process, itself a 
potential means of capturing the regulator through implicitly biasing the regulators’ 
incentives towards the regulated activity.119 The concept of capture is problematic 
because it conveys ‘a sense of illegitimate expropriation, performed by one powerful 
group over others, of the resources we might have thought were provided for public 
interest goals.’120A closer inspection of the practices inhering within the regulator 
constituencies, therefore, calls into question the perceived validity and rigour of the 
separation of powers of, and within, the regulator constituencies.  In consequence, this 
understanding might explain why the subsequently produced rules, including board 
rules, are heavily pro-shareholder.121 
 
Finally, a point that has been lurking in the shadows of the analysis above should be 
brought to light.  It is that these alternative regulatory systems generate a reasonably 
high level of outcome-oriented compliance and conformity of, and within, corporate 
life despite input-legitimacy and democratic concerns.  How might these extensive 
                                                             
118  
119 The pioneering work on capture theory is G. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 
2(1) Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 1.  For a superbly concise account, see T. 
Prosser, ‘Theorising Utilities Regulation’ (1999) 62(2) Modern Law Review 196, 200-206. 
120 L. G. Baxter, ‘“Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel it Toward the Common Good?’ 
(2011) 21(1) Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 175, 176.  For a useful account of regulatory 
capture theory, see Prosser, above n 119, 200-206. 
121 Davies, above n 2, 714-715. 
  34 
and rigorous rule sets function effectively and command the respect of all?  Properly 
understood, the market rule-making bodies that sustain contemporary corporate 
activity are characterised by a political outlook and rule choice that involve norm 
formation targeted exclusively at market participants as opposed to as broad a range 
of individuals as possible.  Arguably, as Marc Moore and Martin Petrin concisely 
note, ‘[t]his has significant implications in terms of how these bodies understand the 
proper bounds of their regulatory remit, as well as in relation to the scope of public 
interest or distributional concerns’.122 Consider, and compare, for example, the review 
process of the Company Law Review’s legislative reform project with the equivalent 
means by which market bodies create and apply regulatory solutions.  The Company 
Law Review consulted extensively and was subject to rigorous Parliamentary scrutiny 
on its self-identified ‘scope’ of company law, however ultimately channelled into the 
deeper shareholder rights bias in the UK’s company law.  Yet the formal consultation 
process of the Takeover Panel’s Code Committee, for example, introduces or amends 
any rules of the Code through comparatively marginal, if useful, dialogue mainly 
(although by no means always) with all relevant ‘deal insiders’.123 In spite of making 
available all responses for public inspection, the presumption and expectation that 
market participants should address and resolve the problems of their own making, 
although producing output-legitimacy in a strictly limited sense, risks being less 
openly and effectively questioned by the general public and in the public policy 
arena.124 This is in spite the fact that the Panel, conceived as functionally silent or 
neutral in respect to distributional concerns extraneous to considerations of 
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shareholder welfare,125 is nevertheless likely to, and does, produce significant and 
extensive socially normative outcomes.126  
 
(iv) From political to technocratic legitimacy 
Based on the above analysis, it might seem misplaced to concentrate upon dominant 
accounts of modern democratic criteria, principally because the operation and outlook 
of market regulatory bodies lie somewhat outside standard legitimacy mechanisms.  
An apparently weak form of input-legitimacy, and a weighted outcome-legitimacy, 
relatively speaking, may scarcely come as a new or exciting truth to proponents of 
market-based regulatory regimes.127 In neoliberal discourse, political legitimacy and 
democratic accountability are relatively important pre-requisites for regulator 
constituencies.  However, the apparent availability of a greater degree of professional 
expertise and market-determinable practices (relative to standard public law-making 
bodies) are often claimed to invoke a rival conception of legitimacy, which supports 
and nourishes both the general acceptability and the actual effects of regulation in two 
distinct ways.128 First, there is the apparently technocratic or practical criteria that 
generates regulatory solutions in the UK, whereby predominantly financial and legal 
intermediaries design and enforce rules in an apparently politically neutral context,129 
which is shaped by a set of professional ideals of what regulatory value judgments are 
economically efficient from the perspective of the marketplace.130 The concept of 
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technocracy maintains the perceived apolitical prerogatives of the regulator, which 
then justifies the public trust that is placed in them to exercise significant and 
extensive regulatory power on a non-arbitrary basis outside of the standard ‘checks 
and balances’ of the democratic state framework.  Second, these regulatory 
formations are reputed to closely reflect the endogenous preferences of private 
business and market participants generally rather than having any social-distributional 
implications in their own right.  Accordingly, the respective rule systems could be 
said to derive their customarily regarded regulatory legitimacy from market 
compliance and conformity, insofar as they commonly seek to reflect rather than 
displace the expected economic interests of the advisors and of their clients generally.   
 
However, it is important to sound a note of caution against these two reputed sources 
of the continuing survival and legitimacy of regulator constituencies in the UK.  First, 
the regulatory ideal, that is a standard (or, perhaps, set of standards) to which private 
or professional arrangements of market forms are said to conform does not relieve us 
from the need to look at the evidence for this claim.  Clearly, the existence of 
empirically dispositive evidence to support this account about optimal market 
solutions in corporate and financial markets regulation is deeply ambivalent. 131 
Equally clearly, descriptive accounts of economic efficiency in this regard tend to be 
conflated with normative values, or are the product of unanalysed assumption and 
borrowing and the cascading of such borrowings.  Rather, the limits of markets as 
regulatory mechanisms for constraining socially suboptimal behaviour and outcomes 
are numerous and well-documented.  On this basis, the most one could say is that 
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‘although a perfect market is superior to an imperfect legal rule, an imperfect market 
may be either better or worse than an imperfect legal rule [emphasis added].’132 It 
follows that in some, but far from all, areas of corporate activity, market-based 
regulation might prove to be the most economically efficient mode of regulation, 
while in others the substantive law might be relatively more effective in this regard.  
In addition to a questionable inscription of economically efficient ideals in 
technocratic rule formation, earlier discussion, meanwhile, has queried whether the 
market-based regulator’s claim to political neutrality or impartial pragmatism is 
necessarily valid.  No doubt, while neutrality of method might be difficult to achieve, 
the regulator constituencies tend to maintain the position that partiality is possible to 
avoid: technocrats avoid value claims, reject political or ideological predispositions, 
and often receive general acceptability in the marketplace.  One problem with this 
approach is that expert knowledge is not necessarily neutral, especially when we have 
observed that regulation may be captured by powerful vested interests, or at least, in 
light of a weighted shareholder presence in existing regulatory solutions, is not always 
used for neutral purposes.  Ultimately, therefore, one needs to be wary of such broad-
brush claims about the plausible, although speculative, legitimacy of the regulator 
through apparently neutral-technocratic and pragmatic expertise. 
 
The second claim about legitimacy of market regulatory formations refers, it will be 
recalled, to the single goal of protecting and advancing economic efficiency (rather 
than social welfare enhancing regulatory solutions) in the marketplace, which, in turn, 
generates compliance and conformity, insofar as the respective rule systems purport to 
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crystallise the expected economic interests of industry and market participants 
generally.  Certainly, the constituent rules and practices of, say, The Takeover Code 
or the Corporate Governance Code often, and understandably, reflect the commercial 
or political interests of financial and legal intermediaries that might otherwise emerge 
through private ordering, were the costs of making adequate provision for all possible 
contingencies sufficiently low.  Simultaneously, targeted norm formation also means 
that some of the most important market-based rules apply, either formally or in 
practice, only to a small, but important, subset of the total population of companies 
regulated under the Companies Act 2006 and earlier legislation, i.e. those which are 
listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange and often only to those 
which have chosen a premium listing.  In some sense, if one were to restrict the 
analytical lens to the exclusive mission goal and targeted audience, explained above, 
there are valid arguments in favour of describing the UK’s approach to company and 
financial market regulation as legitimate, provided that the system applies only to the 
areas of regulation and does not have any wider socially determinative effect in its 
own right.  Yet the Takeover Panel or the FCA, for example, in remaining 
deliberately and consistently silent when it comes to surrounding public policy debate 
about the attraction or otherwise of their overall social effect, while simultaneously 
providing for a formal and enduring weighted shareholder presence in corporate 
governance, could nonetheless have one unintended consequence.  Specifying, it is 
likely that this task-driven method lends significant tacit political or ideological 
support to the idea that protecting and empowering shareholders is inherently 
democratic, although not chosen or necessarily supported by the public at large, or 
even open to meaningful discussion among them.    
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E. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this article, two questions were proposed: the first concerned the 
relationship and interaction between the UK’s substantive company law and its 
market-based regulation and; second, where market bodies have the potential to 
mould and influence the content of legal rules, either because the state is passive or 
the state is active but the law is indeterminate, do they retain a firm basis on which to 
rest their survival and legitimacy?  As to the first, although the UK’s company law 
provides the legal ecology to facilitate productivity organised in companies by 
reducing agency costs between participants, market-based regulators, meanwhile, 
have become increasingly important to the design and enforcement of basic ‘rules of 
the game’ between market participants by reducing socially suboptimal behaviour and 
outcomes.  This is assuredly the case where the British state has deferred lawmaking 
competence to the market because it neither has the time, nor the interest, nor the 
expertise.  However, where there is proactive intervention or role for law, the 
subsequent legal rules are often, and understandably, viewed as somewhat limited in 
effectiveness and outlook.  This is in turn likely to have a number of direct or 
practical implications, not least the dampening effect on the perceived impact of 
company law’s weighted shareholder presence, which, paradoxically, could provide 
the benefit of defining its socially undesirable consequences out of existence.  On this 
basis, in order to interpret and apply the rules in question, policy-makers or 
practitioners might be tempted to draw upon heavily pro-shareholder, if more 
workable, guidance provided in market-based regulatory instruments.  There is 
already some evidence of such an approach.  Turning to the challenges of this 
regulatory ‘spread’, two points can be made.  One is that the main problem about 
market-based regulation in this regard is that it too readily transforms controversial 
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objectives and political issues into question of rulemaking for hybrid state/market 
regulators.  In this way, it takes critical decision-making powers out of the public 
process.  Since that process is the only way the general population is able to engage, 
however indirectly, in the shaping of law, this is arguably contentious from a 
democratic legitimacy perspective.  The other is that these market-based regulators do 
not readily or plausibly lend themselves to dominant pollical narratives and 
democratic criteria, which customarily nourish and support procedural and substantive 
legitimacy of state interventionist techniques in company lawmaking.  What is more, 
the deployment of a rival conception of legitimacy, conceived as neutral technocratic 
expertise and market determinable practices to support both the general acceptability 
and the actual effects of regulation, is arguably contentious because of public choice 
concerns about regulatory capture and the fact that the general acceptability or 
otherwise of market-based rules is typically limited to the marketplace, despite the 
wider socially determinative impact on the population at large. 
 
This subject of enquiry is timely and relevant for two reasons.  First, while this article 
focuses upon the UK corporate regulatory framework and potential challenges, 
questions about the relationship between regulatory instruments and techniques, and 
the relative legitimacy of lawmaking in company law and financial regulation, are 
ones that are of general interest to policy makers around the world operating at 
national, regional, and international levels.  The internationally mobile character of 
much modern business operations make it important for states and regions to 
benchmark their ‘mix’ against that chosen by others, and to ask whether they have 
achieved a achieved a combination that is commercially attractive and likely to 
promote the contribution of the corporate sector to the overall economic and social 
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well-being of society.  Second, the article’s findings have significant ramifications for 
continuing international debates on the devolution of specific functions to market-
based regimes accompanied by new types of public-private interactions.  Many open 
questions remain, theoretically and practically, about these changes and their 
implications for the legitimacy of governance processes. The present article, 
accordingly, develops this important strand of competing thought by framing the 
political and constitutional case that market-based regulation risks undermining the 
rule of law and its democratic potential, with the effect of exacerbating corporate 
threats to public interests.  In doing so, it moves forward the democratic and political 
case for representative lawmaking in company law beyond the contemporary 
neoliberal rationales centred on the relative value of market competence.  
